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What Lines, Rats, and Sheep  
Can Tell Us 
Alex S. Taylor
For Salim—our dear family companion who, lying before me, tells 
me through his breathing, slow movements, and how he folds 
himself that he is readying to leave us. 
“…baboons are not seen to inhabit a world of non-baboons, or ants to 
inhabit a world of non-ants. Apparently only humans inhabit a world 




In “Designs Along a Length of String,” Tim Ingold generously 
invites his audience into his thoughts on lines and meshworks.2 In 
a lecture theater crisscrossed with a “mesh” of string—real 
string!—we are literally and figuratively asked to feel how lines 
feel. Through Ingold’s eyes, his pacing, touching, writing, and 
wording, and through the string around us, we see how lines 
thread, join, loop, knot, turn back on themselves, and hang loose 
and open…, offering the space for more, much more.
 For me, Ingold’s talk of flourishing lines and emergent rela-
tions speaks to his longstanding ideas on “the processional.” With 
his lines and their processional becomings, he is giving us the 
space to think, a “tool for thinking,” as philosopher Isabelle 
Stengers uses the phrase.3 In this article, I want to think with 
Ingold’s ideas and try to work with them in just this fashion, as a 
tool. To begin, I draw out some of the key concepts that Ingold 
introduced in his closing plenary at Research Through Design 
(RTD) in 2015 and weave these concepts into the ideas he has 
developed in his writings. I then thread a new line of questions 
into this thinking by drawing in Vinciane Despret’s beautiful 
accounts of animal–human relations. For many, this might seem an 
unexpected turn, but my intention is to use the coupling of works 
from Ingold and Despret to complicate how design researchers and 
practitioners think and work through design. By turning our atten-
tion to what Ingold refers to as the sympathy that we build up with 
things and, at the same time, to how these active attunements, as 
doi: 10.1162/DESI_a_00449
1 Tim Ingold, Designs Along a Length of 
String—Closing Provocation, Research 
Through Design 2015, Cambridge, UK, 
March 25–27, 2015. 
2 Ibid.
3 Isabelle Stengers, “Introductory Notes on 
an Ecology of Practices,” Cultural Studies 
Review 11 (2013): 185. 
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Despret calls them, afford the conditions for “new existences,” 4 I 
want to suggest that design is much more than a mere augmenting 
of human ability. What especially interests me are the conditions 
made possible through-design and the more-than-human capacities 
that are given a chance in the lively relations between humans and 
nonhumans. Thus, in this knotting together of ideas, what I am 
keen to do is engage in a widening of research through design—that 
is, to offer a different way of engaging with the conference series’ 
short history and put forward a generative alternative that might 
be enacted through design.
Lines
The line is Ingold’s magnum opus; his own thread of stories of walk-
ing, cutting, drawing, sawing, weaving, and dwelling draw us 
back to the ways in which lines are processionally brought into the 
world—how what comes before and what is to follow gives form to 
a present movement.5 The line is Ingold’s answer to the network, 
with its “timeless, motionless, inert” assemblages of nodes and 
connections. For Ingold, the assemblage “will not help… It is too 
static, and it fails to answer the question of how the entities of 
which it is composed actually fasten to each other.” Yet the line, he 
contrasts, “allows us to bring the social back to life. In the life of 
lines, parts are not components; they are movements.”6 The line is 
then in motion, never static, always leading to something or some-
where else. This is, provocatively, a “world without objects.”7 
 The meshwork is a corollary to the line, for there are many 
lines that thread through and between the lives of humans and 
nonhumans. Here, we don’t have to limit ourselves to “blobs,” as 
4 Vinciane Despret, What Would Animals 
Say If We Asked the Right Questions, 
trans. Brett Buchanan (Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 2016).
5 Tim Ingold, “Walking the Plank: Medita-
tions on a Process of Skill,” in Defining 
Technological Literacy: Towards an Epis-
temological Framework, ed. John Dakers 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 
65–80.
6 Tim Ingold, The Life of Lines (Abingdon, 
UK: Routledge, 2015), 15.
7 Ibid., 13–16.
Figure 1 
Tim Ingold, enmeshed in string, in “Designs 
Along a Length of String—Closing 
Provocation,” RTD 2015, March 27, 2015. 
Video Still. Image copyright: Microsoft 
Research Cambridge, UK. Image  
© Research Through Design Conference.
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Ingold calls them, but lines, loops, and knots that thread together 
the lively connections. Again, we are directed away from the static, 
lifeless point—the thing— and led to see the always becoming, 
the “goings-on.” As Ingold puts it, “[t]he thing about things… is 
that they occur—that is, they carry on along their lines.”8 For 
precisely this reason, Ingold draws our attention to the genera- 
tive and emergent qualities of lines, and their twists and knottings 
in meshworks.
 The meshwork of lines also puts relations center stage. 
Ingold’s fascination is with the ways our own lines crisscross with 
sentient and less than sentient others and with how the lines that 
surround us afford a becoming in the world. Here, we find the 
back and forth of sawing a plank is shaped by the cut before, and 
the one to come, but so too by the wood with its grain, and the 
weight of hands and bodies. All work together. Not only does the 
maker cut into the plank; the making also exerts a force back on 
the maker.9 Ingold extends this conceptualization further with his 
growing-in-making or anthropogenesis, where the making is wound 
together with the being, and where what we are and what we 
become is actively threaded into the practices of making. In knit-
ting, “the shape of the clothing might map onto the bodily form of 
the wearer,” but the shape of the garment and the way the body is 
held to wear it “arises from countless micro-gestures of threading 
and looping that turn a continuous thread of yarn into a surface.”10
 Ingold’s concepts and images, then, give us a distinctive 
way to talk about how to approach design; how, piece by piece, 
iteratively, and along a continuous line, transformations are 
made and remade. The ways that we cut, draw, sketch, stitch, 
mold, and weave are movements—made in and along a line of 
string—that knot, shift and flow into others. We might say, as 
Ingold does, that design is forever in an unfolding “attunement” 
and that all manner of things are in continual emergence through 
a rhythm of relations:
 The task of the builder is… to bring one way of life and   
 growth (of the tree in the forest) to a close in preparation  
 for the launching of another (of the craft in the ocean).11
In Ingold’s lines we might see a similar thread to Donald Schön’s 
reflective practice12—though perhaps one that is more grounded in 
the material experience. Ingold sheds light on how we string our-
selves together with others in practice and use such material enact-
ments to reflect-in-action—to move, shift, and adjust, as we saw 
through the plank of wood. Similarly, Ingold speaks to the mesh of 
interconnecting lines, or conversations as Manzini refers to them, 
through which design emerges: “the tangle of conversations occur-
ring during design activities… and the conversations that take 
place in various design arenas” (emphasis in original).13 Yet Ingold 
8 Ibid., 16.
9 For a wonderfully detailed description of 
sawing a plank of wood, see Ingold, 
“Walking the Plank,” 65–80.
10 Ingold, The Life of Lines, 122–24.
11 Ibid., 121.
12 Donald A. Schön, The Reflective Practi-
tioner: How Professionals Think in Action 
(New York: Basic Books, 1983).
13 Ezio Manzini, “Design Culture and Dia-
logic Design,” Design Issues 32, no. 1 
(Winter 2016): 54.
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14 Ingold, The Life of Lines, 24.
15 Ingold, “Designs Along a Length  
of String.” 
16 In articulating his idea of correspon-
dence, Ingold seeks to put the active 
human back into the world and among 
things. He counters anthropomorphic or 
human-centric “capacities of conscious 
intentionality and agency” by replacing 
intention with attention, subject with 
verb, and human agency with “doing-in-
undergoing of humanifying.” See Ingold, 
The Life of Lines, 152.
17 Ibid., 13.
18 The reference is to Daniel Fallman’s use 
of “exploratory.” Fallman offers us a  
language to expand ideas of “through 
design,” pointing to an investigative or 
exploratory purpose to designing and 
making. See Daniel Fallman, “The Inter-
action Design Research Triangle of 
Design Practice, Design Studies, and 
Design Exploration,” Design Issues 24, 
no. 3 (Summer 2008): 4–18.
19 Ingold, The Life of Lines, 155.
brings our attention again to the hands, to the physical relations 
we thread together in making. Through a processional language of 
practice, we see “the form of a thing does not stand over it or lie 
behind it but emerges from this mutual shaping, within a gather-
ing of forces, both tensile and frictional, established through the 
engagement of the practitioner with materials that have their own 
inclinations and vitality.”14
 But, for me at least, the processional qualities and relational 
unfoldings that Ingold surfaces have a deeper resonance for 
design. What seizes me in his ideas is a view of design that is 
always working toward what can be—whether it imagines itself to 
be doing so or not—rather than being stuck in the realm of what is 
(or is not), or what limits exist. As Ingold repeatedly recounts it, 
design is materially embedded or entangled in the endless thread-
ing together of preceding and present lines, always laying the 
foundations for what is to come: “You begin to think of design 
actually as a correspondence of lines that are twisting around one 
another….”15 And correspondence, for Ingold, is about much more 
than the subject and object, than human agency and its mastery 
over the thing; instead, correspondence accounts for active trajec-
tories and transformations that occur between human and non-
human lives.16
 This, I suggest, offers us an expansive view of design, where 
“things are continually coming into being through processes of 
growth and movement.”17 This view not only places design in an 
exploratory mode,18 but also poses a lot of hard questions to those 
who want to draw tidy lines between ourselves as autonomous 
actors and the tools used to design, and indeed what is produced 
through design. Thus, in surfacing the many connections and dis-
tributions of human agencies, we are forced to ask what we mean 
when we talk about a design that is human-centered and that 
places the human as part of but still somehow separate from mate-
rial practice. Ingold tells us that making, in its broadest sense, can’t 
be simply bracketed off from being, and neither can being be sepa-
rated from making. We are in an unending thread of becoming as 
we make: “Humans are not just the producers of objects to con-
sume. They too are transformed in the process; what they achieve 
is achieved in them.”19 
 In the remainder of this article, I use this as an inflection 
point, asking what it means to design and research through design. 
What effects and affects are we seeking to enliven? In what ways 
are we hoping to make an impression in worlds? And ultimately, 
what relations do we hope to afford between ourselves and the 
things we are aspiring to live with and through? Taking Ingold’s 
invitation to heart, I make the case that it no longer seems good 
enough to see the things we design as tools or instruments that 
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merely augment our capacities. These “tools” or “instruments” do 
not merely offer, in a very limited sense, materials that overcome 
our intrinsic human limits, so that we might see, hear, reach, 
grasp, draw, and make better. Again, we find in Ingold an attun-
ement with the world of things, where we emerge as “more-than-
human” through our unfolding relations.20 Unbounded through 
our relations and rapport with things, we are enabled to do and be 
so much more than autonomous actors; we extend ourselves 
through mutual forces (impressions and sensations)—the twists 
and knots binding lines of string give form to and shape move-
ment. 
Other Beings
Yet, I develop my thinking not with Ingold’s lines alone, but with 
the introduction of what might seem an unusual and admittedly 
peculiar companion—namely, a view into ethology, and specifi-
cally the view of Vinciane Despret and her profoundly uplifting 
and intellectually arousing examination of the lives we humans 
share with other living animals. This move, as I’ve said, may seem 
a peculiar disjuncture, but my guess is that Ingold might appreci-
ate the connection. In the quote that opens this article, Ingold is in 
the midst of reminding his audience that, in a contemporary phi-
losophy obsessed with the relations between humans and nonhu-
mans, we find a peculiar lack of interest in animals. In his RTD 
2015 talk, we might hear an invitation to speculate on such mat-
ters.20
 What’s more, Despret, I feel, responds with a reasonable 
rapprochement to Ingold’s worries about the term “assemblage.” 
Referring to the frequent translation of Gilles Deleuze’s agencement 
to “assemblage,” she writes:
 I would rather opt for keeping the French word: agencement. 
 First, this term renders perceptible the intimate link   
 between “agencement” and “agency,” and second, it insists  
 upon an active process of attunement that is never fixed  
 once and for all. An agencement is a rapport of forces  
 that makes some beings capable of making other beings  
 capable, in a plurivocal manner, in such a way that  
 the agencement resists being dismembered, resists clear- 
 cut distribution.22
Despret at one level, then, is dealing with matters much like 
Ingold. She troubles assemblage in much the same way and 
points, like him, to the “active process[es] of attunement” that 
resist a separation from the rapports and plurivocality of the agen-
cement. Agencement for Despret is, thus, a relationality between 
multiple forces—a rapport—that sounds very much like the many 
entwined threads or lines of the meshwork.
20 Hannah Pitt has used Ingold directly to 
develop such a view of “more-than-
human.” See Hannah Pitt, “On Showing 
and Being Shown Plants: A Guide to 
Methods for More-than-Human Geogra-
phy,” Area 47 (2015): 48–55. On “more-
than-human,” also see Sarah Whatmore’s 
inspirational article: “Materialist Returns: 
Practising Cultural Geography in and  
for a More-than-Human World,” Cultural 
Geographies 13 (2006): 600–09.
21 Ingold also has written at this intersec-
tion of animals and humans. See Tim 
Ingold, “Introduction,” in What Is  
an Animal? , ed. Tim Ingold (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 1–16. 
22 Vinciane Despret, “From Secret Agents  
to Interagency,” History and Theory 52 
(2013): 38. 
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 Despret’s unique reading of animals and their manifold 
relations seems to me to equip us with a way to further work 
through the kind of thinking that Ingold invites. To be specific, 
what matters here—that is deeply relevant for design and the par-
ticular thread of thinking we are following—is Despret’s vividly 
expressed open-mindedness to an expansion of agential capabili-
ties.23 By paying close attention to Despret’s work (and the many 
scholars she recognizes in her writings), we find not only much in 
common with Ingold’s ideas of the processional, but a catalogue of 
detailed examples of how mutual relations can be thought of as 
extending or expanding capability. In celebrating her achieve-
ments, Buchanan, Chrulew, and Busso write of Despret’s work as 
“the practical study of what humans or animals can do.” Her view 
onto multi-specied relations, they explain, is “not of what they are, 
of their essence, but of what they’re capable, of what they’re doing, 
of the powers that are theirs….”24
 In reading her catalogue of stories, it is difficult not to be 
compelled by Despret’s sensitivity to how connections are made 
and relations unfold to produce something more-than— something 
only possible through precisely the activities of a woman feeding 
her sheep, a breeder talking with his cows, or a parrot talking with 
an ethologist. In more than 20 years of thinking and writing about 
these matters, Despret has strung together far too many wonderful 
and generative stories to repeat here. However, I want to touch on 
just two areas of her work that can help us develop a sense of what 
her ideas offer.
 I turn first to a seemingly straightforward case. Despret has 
put a good deal of thought into the behavioral experiments to 
which rats (and other animals) are subjected, and specifically into 
the use of the manufactured maze as an artifact of experimenta-
tion.25 We know the drill: A rat is deprived of something—for 
example, food, senses, or body parts—or “provided” with some-
thing—drugs, alcohol, or nicotine. She or he is then judged for her 
or his capacity to learn and navigate a maze (usually to find food). 
So on its face, the test would seem to be whether the rat has an 
instinctive capacity for navigation and spatial learning. This test 
also operates on the premise that everything else can be controlled 
so that rats only navigate a maze when they are hungry and to 
obtain food. (Crucially, this biological register forms the basis for 
claiming that any observable capacity can be generalized to other 
animals, including humans.) Yet, with Despret’s guidance, we 
immediately run into a question about these sorts of experiments 
that is never seriously asked, but would appear to be quite funda-
mental to what is at stake: “How can this experimental arrange-
ment possibly interest an animal?” Or to phrase it slightly 
differently, as perhaps the animal might, “what could they (the 
humans) possibly be interested in?”26
23 I’m mindful of the concern for capabilities 
shown in design, such as that from Ilse 
Oosterlaken. See Ilse Oosterlaken, 
“Design for Development: A Capability 
Approach,” Design Issues 25, no. 4 
(Autumn 2009): 91–102. Although I’m not 
unsympathetic to Oosterlaken’s call to be 
led by human capabilities, rather than the 
more limiting options of income, resource 
provisioning, and utility, among others, 
the point I put forward is more focused 
on how capability is enacted through 
human–nonhuman relations, that we 
might be open to how more than human 
capabilities come into being. 
24 Brett Buchanan, Matthew Chrulew, and 
Jeffrey Busso, “On Asking the Right 
Questions,” Angelaki 20 (2015): 116.
  25 See Vinciane Despret, “Thinking Like a 
Rat,” Angelaki 20 (2015): 121–34; and 
Vinciane Despret, “L Is for Laboratory: 
What Are Rats Interested in During 
Experiments?” in Would Animals Say, 
88–96. 
26 Despret, “Thinking Like a Rat.”
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 If we think through these experiments and follow what 
happens “back stage,” as Despret does, we find that animals of all 
kinds (e.g., cats, rats, parrots) often fail to be “conditioned” for the 
particular purposes of the controlled experiment—put simply, 
food doesn’t seem to be the only imperative, and the wider experi-
mental conditions, no matter how restrictive the controls, con-
found the efforts to determine general accounts of animal/human 
behavior. After being  deprived of food, cats refuse to eat; sub-
jected to repeated recordings of human speech paired with food 
rewards, myna birds show disinterest in talking; in carefully con-
trolled environments, rats are better at learning routes if the exper-
imenters think they are intelligent; and so on. However, “off 
stage,” these animals show in a multitude of ways capabilities that 
exceed the narrow view presented by these (null) results: Cats 
show a curiosity in the lives of their experimenters; myna birds 
talk when their experimenters take them home; and rats, among 
other accomplishments, reportedly run faster when observed by 
humans. These “results” are never reported because they contra-
vene the motives of the experiment and fail to correctly respond to 
what the experiment and experimenters have set out to answer:
 If an animal responds according to his own habits, in the  
 register of what interests him, the researchers would  
 consider this a kind of “ruse”—he admittedly did what  
 was asked of him, but he did so for the “wrong reasons.”27
Experimental research of this kind does everything in its power to 
compartmentalize and purify the conditions, but in so doing, it 
strips the experiments of precisely those things that make the 
world meaningful. Rats are literally stripped of their senses, mazes 
are stripped of their discernable features, and experimenters are 
persuaded to leave the details of the relations with animals “off 
stage.” Sort after is a primitive, innate stimulus–response pair, 
which might somehow exist outside the meanings and relevances 
of the animals being examined. What is left bears little to no rela-
tionship to the world that the experimenter is hoping to produce 
some relevant effect. The situation is nothing more than perverse. 
Despret can’t help but see the funny side:
 The humor of the situation is too nice not to be underlined:  
 The researchers compartmentalize the research; the animals  
 do not stop prompting them to decompartmentalize it.28
For Despret, much of the trouble comes down to asking the right 
questions. And for her, the right questions are not whether ani-
mals can be duped into responding this way or that to some stimu-
lus that has little or no relevance to them, but instead whether we 
can ask questions that give animals the chance to convey their 
own interests and ways of doing things, and that give them the 
opportunity to communicate these to us humans.
27 Despret, “L Is for Laboratory,” 92.
28 Despret, “Thinking Like a Rat,” 130.
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 We might seem to be a long way from the design of things, 
and from what we might want to do through design, but there is 
a point here, I feel, that should be important to us. In short, we 
might understand that a good deal of work done through design 
compartmentalizes in a similar way. Yes, we grapple with being 
sensitive to the contexts in which actions and activities occur—and 
indeed to a wider culture.29 But we have very few if any tools (or 
a register) for working with everything, altogether. By viewing 
things in terms of affordances, human actions, and system out-
puts, we do not seem all that far from that innate stimulus–
response pair. We reduce things to a sequence of defined steps— 
a tool’s design, input, interaction, output—and neglect the world 
that is being lived in and how living brings things together so 
that they have meaning and relevance to us. That is, to determine 
some general principles about a design, through design, we have 
diverted our attention away from the very things we do to make 
the world personally meaningful. We have failed to develop ways 
to think and talk in terms of the dialogue we build up with the 
surroundings: with other humans and nonhumans and with the 
ways these relations unfold over time.30 And we too easily for- 
get to recognize that our experiences with the artifacts we design 
cannot be bracketed off or compartmentalized from what is mean-
ingful, and how that meaning is brought, actively, into the world.31 
For Ingold, lines speak directly to how this oversight might be 
overcome:
 You [can] begin to think of design actually as a correspon- 
 dence of lines that are twisting around one another…. And  
 instead of thinking about articulation—articulation means  
 the coupling of rigid elements—we actually [can] talk  
 about sympathy, which is about the way in which things  
 are continually responding to one another. So I’m thinking  
 we should think about design in terms of sympathetic  
 relationships, or what I call correspondence, rather than  
 in terms of the articulation of elements.32
I feel, though, that Despret provides us with a grounding for what 
we might actually wish to research through design. Finding inspi-
ration in Despret’s work, design might concern itself—dare I say—
with the unfolding dialogue targeted at answering that question: 
“In what are you interested?” Research through design would be a 
starting place for speculating on how we begin such a dialogue 
that doesn’t compartmentalize and that accounts for the richer, 
emerging set of relations: “… this has to do with beings who nego-
tiate the conditions of research, who mutually affect one another, 
who exchange judgments and opinions, who reciprocally modify 
one another and who know that they do it.”33 So design might offer 
up the space not to enforce (from the outside) what should interest 
29 A sensitivity to context is the hackneyed 
lesson we’ve taken from Lucy Suchman, 
among others. See Lucy Suchman, 
Human–Machine Reconfigurations: Plans 
and Situated Actions, 2nd Ed. (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006). For attempts to articulate a wider 
sensitivity, see Manzini, “Design Culture 
and Dialogic Design.” 
30 Note the parallel here with Grant Kester’s 
idea of dialogical interaction. Kester 
builds on Habermas’s theory of discourse 
to suggest a dialogical aesthetic, in 
which meaning is not intrinsic in a piece, 
or definitively controlled by the artist, but 
something provisional, actively built up 
between an artwork and a collective of 
onlookers or co-participants. See Grant 
Kester, Conversation Pieces: Community 
and Communication in Modern Art 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2004). 
31 Annemarie Mol’s ontological politics and 
ontonorms add a complementary per-
spective to this active becoming. Mol 
writes of the hope to “sensitize us to 
materialities and issues of good and bad 
at the same time.” In this work, she 
draws and holds matter, meaning, and 
value together, laying the basis for a reg-
ister for everything altogether. See 
Annemarie Mol, “Mind Your Plate! The 
Ontonorms of Dutch Dieting,” Social 
Studies of Science 43 (2013): 381.
32 Ingold, “Designs Along a Length of 
String.”
33 Despret, “Thinking Like a Rat,” 131.
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us, but to begin wondering how we might be open to the possibili-
ties of what could become interesting—of how to develop, twist, 
and cultivate these possibilities between an artifact and its user. 
We can then take seriously a design that is open to the question, 
“How could this possibly be made interesting?”
 The second area of Despret’s work that I draw on is related 
to this openness. One of Despret’s stories considers sheep and the 
ways they organize themselves. The “classical” view in ethology, 
as Despret refers to it, is that sheep are most obviously character-
ized by their instinctive drive to eat (much like rats). The trouble is, 
this version of the collective behavior of sheep does nothing to 
overcome the strikingly superficial understanding we have of 
them, nor does it account for the vexing questions that arise if a bit 
more care is put into understanding the lives they live. For exam-
ple, it fails to consider that the preoccupation with sheep and their 
food may be because eating is one of the easier things to find sheep 
doing, or that so much of what we observe sheep doing is dictated 
by the strict regimes of breeding to which they are subject. Any 
inventiveness in sheep is quickly selected out of a flock. Small 
wonder, then, that we know so little about what sheep are inter-
ested in, other than grass. Despret writes:
 [The sheep] have never been able to testify to what interests 
them since whatever it is that might interest them has been 
offered no affordance, no possibility of articulation with what 
interests those who attest on their behalf.34 
One recurrent trope that has been spun from this impoverished 
version of sheep life is that of the hierarchy—and specifically the 
way the competition for food is said to play a central role in deter-
mining the organization of sheep.35 Sheep flocks are repeatedly 
characterized as led by long-horned, dominant males that fight for 
control, “corresponding to theories of hierarchy (they obtain the 
right to push their way around with their horns, the males in front 
and the females behind).”36 However, through the work of Thelma 
Rowell (a primatologist who has turned her attention to sheep), 
Despret suggests another version of events that is equally plausi-
ble and, it must be said, seems to be considerably more attentive to 
the situations in which sheep find themselves. Challenging what 
she calls the “scandal” of the hierarchy, Rowell makes the claim 
that a concern for predators, rather than food alone, is what occu-
pies sheep and dictates their social organization. A possible reason 
for their seemingly obvious concern for food might be that the 
human observer is in fact a deterrent for predators. Much of the 
effort and organization invested in managing predation is miti-
gated by the presence of human observers (e.g., ethologists) so that 
observers simply witness the sheep getting on with the business of 
eating. Perversely, by observing them and reducing their apparent 
34 Vinciane Despret, “Sheep Do Have Opin-
ions,” in Making Things Public: Atmo-
spheres of Democracy, eds. Bruno Latour 
and Peter Weibel (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2006): 363.
35 Despret offers a provocative critique of 
hierarchy. See Vinciane Despret, “H is for 
Hierarchy: Might the Dominance of 
Males Be a Myth?” in What Would Ani-
mals Say, 53–60.
36 Despret, “Sheep Do Have Opinions,” 354.
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capacities through our limited register, we have, quite possibly, 
also given them the opportunity to widen their repertoire—allow-
ing them to use the safety that human observers afford to arrange 
and organize themselves differently.
 Further complicating matters, and showing a sophistication 
not accounted for by the hierarchy model, Rowell shows that the 
fighting between rams for leadership is largely limited to the one 
month of mating each year; that fights are highly ritualized and 
performative, with few signs of all-out battles for a blunt idea of 
supremacy; that older females often lead flocks outside of mating 
season; and that relationships other than the usually fleeting fights 
between males demand study—including the “friendships” 
between males and the lasting companionships between ewes and 
their daughters.37
 This string of alternative accounts, offering different ver-
sions of sheep’s lives, led Rowell to design an inventive kind of 
device for observing sheep. As Despret recounts, Rowell’s device—
devised during a time in which she followed her primatology 
training and effectively lived among the sheep—was an additional 
food bowl. She fed her 22 companions from 23 bowls. This device 
was a strikingly small and simple one and was designed to offer 
the sheep the chance to display an alternative to the orthodoxy in 
ethology—to reveal that a hierarchical configuration organized for 
the purposes of food consumption might not be all that matters to 
sheep. Just as the human observer might afford a new repertoire, 
the additional bowl of food was Rowell’s invitation to the sheep to 
reveal something they had not been given the chance to do before: 
to show themselves to be socially sophisticated.
 As an example, this device is relevant to design because it 
moves us closer to what being open through design might look 
like. What Despret refers to as versions is helpful here.38 Like 
Ingold’s lines and their corresponding meshworks, these versions 
speak to the multiple threads that bring the world into being; 
Despret’s “versions draw a web.”39 Despret uses the idea to suggest 
not just a plurality of worlds that affect us, but an openness to 
worlds coexisting, and from this step an openness to the possibil-
ity of other worlds, other versions. For Despret, then, they amount 
to a device that affords hesitation—a chance to ask questions about 
what might just be possible, how differences might flourish and 
allow “many more entities to be active.”40 This perspective amounts 
to an additive empiricism, according to Bruno Latour—one that is 
“interested in objective facts and grounded claims” but seeks to 
“complicate, to specify, and, whenever possible, to slow down and, 
above all, hesitate so as to multiply the voices that can be heard.”41
 So, through design, the question of openness is the question 
of how we might allow other possibilities to emerge, and how 
these possibilities might be “additive”—how they might be devices 
37 For a helpful overview of the complica-
tions, see Vinciane Despret, “Culture and 
Gender Do Not Dissolve into How Scien-
tists ‘Read’ Nature: Thelma Rowell’s Het-
erodoxy,” in Rebels, Mavericks, and 
Heretics in Biology, ed. Oren Harman 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2008): 338–55. Examples of Rowell’s 
work on sheep include Thelma Rowell 
and C. A. Rowell, “The Organization of 
Feral Ovies Aries Ram Groups in the Pre-
Rut Period,” Ethology 95 (1993): 213–32; 
and Thelma Rowell, “Till Death Do Us 
Part: Long-Lasting Bonds Between Ewes 
and Their Daughters,” Animal Behavior 
42 (1991): 681–82.
38 Vinciane Despret, “The Body We Care 
For: Figures of Anthropo-Zoo-Genesis,” 
Body & Society 10 (2004): 111–34. 
39 Despret, “V for Versions: Do Chimpan-
zees Die Like We Do?,” in What Would 
Animals Say,” 169–76.
40 Despret, “The Body We Care For,” 123.
41 Bruno Latour, “Foreword,” in Vinciane 
Despret, What Would Animals Say, ix.
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that allow for “many more entities” to be active. As Despret herself 
conveys, this openness stands in stark contrast to the vision, 
which is so often found in design. The vision implies a position 
to be taken, some predisposition to one version over others; it is 
more of a personal opinion. Meanwhile, version speaks to the “plu-
rality and mutual transformability” of worlds.42 These versions are 
lines of becoming, lines open to transformations. As both Ingold 
and Despret suggest, the transformations in our being occur in 
and through the interminglings. As Ingold asks so astutely: “Is not 
the workman, too, a being among others, including non-human 
others, whose mastery only follows what they have granted 
him…? Are we not always with things before we do anything to 
them?”43 Despret’s concern for these non-human others offers a 
stronger sense of what forms the underpinnings of this being 
“granted” and being “with”; the possibility is given, through new 
articulations and co-figurings, for things to transgress what is 
assumed to be their essence, to actively undergo metamorphosis by 
attunement or “becoming-with.”44
 Moreover, Despret’s understanding of authorizing adds a 
further depth to these versions; she invites us to think of “expec-
tations in terms of ‘who authorizes,’” from which she suggests that 
“we can see that everything is shifting, articulating many more 
things, giving chances to many more entities to belong to the real 
world.”45 The crux of the matter for Despret seems to turn on trust 
and faith—of trusting and having faith in worlds that could be 
more open to different ways of being. In this realm, we might not 
think of designed artifacts as only affording actions or behaviors. 
In countering the repertoire of limitations and “redistributing 
the influence,” we might also come to think of them (and the con-
ditions they are used in) as authorizing other possibilities, other 
versions. How a thing (in particular conditions) can authorize, 
through design, becomes a strategy to invite more versions, to 
give more versions a chance: “It allows us to transform a cascade of 
bad faith into its opposite, into a cascade of new existences raising 
new questions.”46 
Going-On
To be clear, my suggestion here is to set the openings in motion, 
and to offer a little bit more faith and trust in things, is not simply 
based on making a superficial case for likening animals, such as 
rats and sheep, to the artifacts we design. Such a suggestion would 
be wrong in too many ways! For me, the relevance for design here 
is a deeper and more profound one: It is concerned with animating 
the relations we have with things in the world (and the relations 
they have to us) and finding ways to extend the mutual capacities, 
the mutual becomings. This perspective directs our attention not 
only toward the product, service, or, indeed, experience we design. 
42 Buchanan offers a helpful precis of 
Despret’s use of versions. See Brett 
Buchanan, “The Metamorphoses of  
Vinciane Despret,” Angelaki 20  
(2015): 24. 
43 Ingold, The Life of Lines, 128.
44 Yet again, Ingold and Despret draw  
many parallels here. Both write of the 
active processes of “becoming together” 
and use the language of attunement and 
metamorphosis to capture the mutual, 
ongoing relations. See Vinciane Despret, 
“Responding Bodies and Partial Affinities 
in Human-Animal Worlds,” Theory,  
Culture & Society 30 (2013): 51–76;  
and Ingold, The Life of Lines.”
45 Despret, “The Body We Care For,” 120.
46 Ibid., 120–21.
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Instead, it urges us to expand the capacities our endlessly unfold-
ing relations have for creating and extending ourselves-with-oth-
ers. The opportunity arises to understand “through-design” not as 
a way to sketch out a vector space for research, but to speculate on 
“becoming-with”: becoming with the world, and becoming with 
the conditions and capabilities design might make possible.
 Ingold’s invitation to consider design beyond what he calls 
articulation is a helpful one: “So I’m thinking we should think 
about design in terms of sympathetic relationships or what I call 
correspondence rather than in terms of the articulation of ele-
ments.”47 Too easily, through design, we can feel the impulse to be 
responsive to our capacities, seeing them as a set of primitive or 
primordial needs to be accommodated; this view seems to lead us 
into the language of articulation or augmentation. We see tools as a 
way to somehow work with and within our limits, and thus the 
need to couple, as Ingold refers to them, to “rigid elements.” What 
we find in Despret’s stories with animals, as well as Ingold’s 
strings and lines, are lessons for how we might begin to treat the 
relations—the correspondences—as openings and as opportuni-
ties and possibilities for more sympathetic, richer, and more 
expansive ways of becoming together. We then face the possibility 
of getting past the limiting language of human-centeredness that 
cannot do anything but overestimate our mastery and agency in 
the world. Our entangled lines and lives with animals give us the 
possibility to dream for new entities and, through design, to begin 
to give these entities the chance:
 If one is designing along a length of string, then it’s about  
 hopes and dreams and not about the plans and predictions.  
 It’s where the hopes and dreams always exceed, overstep  
 any kinds of ends you might place for them. So designers’  
 longing is something like breaking a trail; it’s open-ended,  
 it deals with hopes and dreams rather than plans and  
 predictions….48
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47 Ingold, “Designs Along a Length of 
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48 Ibid.
